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1 Introduction
Both in game theory and in general equilibrium theory there exists a number of adjustment
processes that are universally convergent. A universally convergent adjustment process in
game theory is an adjustment process that converges to a Nash equilibrium for almost all
games. A universally convergent adjustment process in general equilibrium theory is an
adjustment process that converges to a Walrasian equilibrium for almost all economies.
In game theory these processes typically serve the role of selecting a Nash equilibrium.
Examples are the tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) or the equilibrium
selection procedure proposed by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). In general equilibrium the
processes are adjustment rules by which an auctioneer can clear all markets. Examples are
the processes studied by Smale (1976), van der Laan (1987) and Talman, Kamiya (1990)
and Herings (1997a).
There are several reasons to be interested in universally convergent adjustment pro-
cesses. They give players in a game the opportunity to coordinate on a uniquely determined
Nash equilibrium and an auctioneer in an economy to determine a competitive equilibrium
price system. In a more decentralized setting, they give rational agents in an economy the
possibility to coordinate on current and future prices. Such processes can be used as a
tool to compute equilibria, which is also helpful for comparative statics exercises or policy
recommendations, see Judd (1997) and Eaves and Schmedders (1999).
In game theory multiplicity of Nash equilibria seems to be the rule rather than the
exception. This poses serious problems for Nash equilibrium to be used as a solution
concept for games. One way out is to develop a theory that selects a unique equilibrium
for any game form, and to suppose that all players adopt that theory. An attempt to
make such a theory can be found in Harsanyi and Selten (1988). This theory relies heavily
on the tracing procedure as introduced in Harsanyi (1975). The tracing procedure is a
strategy adjustment procedure by which players can adopt initial beliefs about the play
of their opponents and turn them into uniquely determined beliefs consistent with Nash
equilibrium. The surprising aspect of the tracing procedure is that convergence to a Nash
equilibrium takes place for almost any game for almost any initial beliefs, so the tracing
procedure is universally convergent.
Quantal response equilibria as introduced in McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), are statisti-
cal versions of Nash equilibria, where each player's payo is subject to random error. The
concept of equilibrium is consistent in the sense that all player's maximize their utility
given the choices made by the others, and the utility maximizing behavior of a player,
together with the error structure, leads to the mixed strategy against which the others
optimize. Quantal response equilibria are quite successful in describing the behavior of
participants in experiments. McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) also consider a procedure simi-
2
lar to the tracing procedure to select a Nash equilibrium. Start with the quantal response
equilibrium where choices are completely determined by the error terms, and follow the
path of quantal response equilibria that results when the error terms vanish. McKelvey
and Palfrey show that for almost all games, a unique Nash equilibrium is selected in this
way. Again, universal convergence of the procedure is obtained.
The simplest price adjustment process studied in general equilibrium theory is the Wal-
rasian tatonnement process. It is well-known that it may not converge to a competitive
equilibrium, see Scarf (1960) for some examples. The work of Sonnenschein (1972, 1973),
Mantel (1974) and Debreu (1974), basically claiming that any function satisfying Walras'
law is the excess demand function of an economy, makes clear that it is possible to con-
struct many examples where Walrasian tatonnement does not converge and displays highly
irregular dynamic behavior. The work of Saari and Simon (1978) and Saari (1985) implies
that simple adaptations of the Walrasian tatonnement process will not have better conver-
gence properties. Still, at least three universally convergent price adjustment processes are
known in the literature, Smale's global Newton method introduced in Smale (1976), the
process of Kamiya (1990), and the process proposed in van der Laan and Talman (1987)
for which universal convergence has been shown in Herings (1997a).
The global Newton method of Smale provides a price adjustment rule that does converge
to a competitive equilibrium for almost any economy, so universal convergence is the case.
But it does not converge for any initial price system. Only when the initial price system is
chosen such that the prices of some commodities are suciently close to zero, convergence
to a competitive equilibrium can be shown. From the work of Keenan (1981) it follows
that there may exist an open set of starting price systems for which Smale's process does
not converge to some competitive equilibrium price system.
Another universally convergent price adjustment process has been presented in Kamiya
(1990). Under rather weak conditions on the total excess demand function, convergence
to a competitive equilibrium price system is guaranteed for almost every starting price
system. Although the boundary conditions of Kamiya are weak, they are not derived from
assumptions on primitive concepts.
An alternative price adjustment process has been proposed in van der Laan and Talman
(1987). For this process universal convergence has been shown in Herings (1997a). Under
standard conditions on utility functions, consumption sets and initial endowments, this
price adjustment process converges to a Walrasian equilibrium price system for almost all
economies and almost all starting price systems.
Apparently, several processes in distinct areas of research have been shown to be uni-
versally convergent. The reason for these strong convergence properties has remained
mysterious up to now, and the convergence proofs were rather ad hoc as a consequence.
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The aim of the current paper is to point out that convergence of each one of these processes
can be understood from xed-point theory and is not even related to dierentiability. This
makes our proofs very dierent from the original convergence proofs. It also increases our
understanding as to why these distinct adjustment processes converge. This understanding
is useful to develop other universally convergent mechanisms that may incorporate features
that are lacking in current processes. For instance, the incorporation of strategic eects of
agents that supply and demand commodities in general equilibrium.
Some alternatives and extensions have already been suggested. The procedure descibed
in Yamamoto (1993) may serve as an alternative to the tracing procedure, and Joosten
and Talman (1997) describe an alternative price adjustment process. Extensions have been
made to economies with linear or constant returns to scale production, see van den Elzen
(1993, 1997) and van den Elzen, van der Laan and Talman (1994), and to economies with
short-run price rigidities, see Herings (1996), Herings, van der Laan, Talman and Venniker
(1997), Herings, van der Laan and Venniker (1998), and Herings, van der Laan and Talman
(1999). All these extensions can be understood as well from the unifying treatment that
is given in this paper.
2 A Unifying Approach
Before turning to the specic adjustment processes, it is helpful to highlight the approach
that can be used to give a unifying treatment of convergence. Usually, dynamic processes
are dened by a system of rst-order dierential equations
dx(t)
dt
= g(x(t));
where x(t) 2 IR
m
denotes the state vector reached at time t 2 IR
+
and g is a function from
some subset of the state space IR
m
into IR
m
: The vector x typically corresponds to a mixed
strategy combination in case of a strategy adjustment process, and to a price system for
a price adjustment process. The function g species the way in which players adjust their
strategies, or prices adjust in general equilibrium. The initial state x(0) is assumed to be
given.
Conditions for which the system of dierential equations has a solution are well-known,
see for instance Hirsch and Smale (1974). The orbit (x(0)) is the set of state vectors that
is generated by the system of rst-order dierential equations when the initial state is x(0);
(x(0)) = fx 2 IR
m
j 9t  0; x = x(t)g:
We denote the closure of (x(0)) by (x(0)); and call (x(0)) an orbit as well.
Although all adjustment processes we consider can be formulated as a system of dif-
ferential equations, they can alternatively be described by the orbit that they generate.
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In fact, all adjustment processes considered share the property that the easiest way to
formulate them is in terms of the orbit that they generate. For each adjustment process,
we dene a system of equations whose solutions correspond to the orbit of the adjustment
process. We study the properties of the set of solutions to the system of equations by
means of xed point theory and not by the theory of dynamic systems.
Our assumptions on primitives are so weak, that orbits are not necessarily nicely be-
haved sets, that is dierentiable paths or loops. It is for instance possible that pitchforks
may arise, or even higher dimensional solution sets. The way that is usually dealt with
such complications is to show that they generically do not occur. For almost all games
and for almost all economies that satisfy suitable dierentiability conditions, orbits are
dierentiable paths or loops. We show that as far as convergence is concerned, neither
genericity arguments nor dierentiability are the main driving forces. Instead, the key to
understand convergence comes from an entirely dierent direction, xed point theory. In
this paper we argue that the convergence of the tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten,
the selection of a Nash equilibrium by means of quantal response equilibria as proposed
by McKelvey and Palfrey, and the convergence of the price adjustment processes of Smale,
Kamiya, and van der Laan and Talman, are best understood from a single xed point
theorem that is introduced in Browder (1960).
Theorem 2.1 (Browder's fixed point theorem): Let S be a non-empty, com-
pact, convex subset of IR
m
and let ' : S  [0; 1] ! S be a continuous function. Then
the set F
'
= f(; s) 2 [0; 1]  S j s = '(; s)g contains a connected set F
c
'
such that
(f0g  S) \ F
c
'
6= ; and (f1g  S) \ F
c
'
6= ;:
Theorem 2.1 implies that for all  2 [0; 1]; (fg  S) \ F
'
6= ;: That property would
also follow from a repeated application of the well-known xed point theorem of Brouwer
(1912). The surprising part of the theorem is that there exists a connected set F
c
'
with
those properties. Notice that along the connected set of xed points, it is not necessarily
the case that  increases monotonically from 0 to 1. The value of  increases initially, may
decrease later on, and will eventually increase until it reaches the value 1.
3 The Tracing Procedure of Harsanyi and Selten
The tracing procedure is used repeatedly in the equilibrium selection theory of Harsanyi
and Selten (1988) to nd a unique solution of so-called basic games. It is also used to dene
risk-dominance relationships between Nash equilibria. It models a process of convergent
expectations by which rational players will come to adopt and expect each other to adopt on
5
a particular Nash equilibrium as the solution for a given game. Before applying the tracing
procedure, players are assumed to have a common probability distribution expressing their
expectations about the strategy choices of the other players. This common probability
distribution is called a prior. In the linear tracing procedure the information on the best
replies to the prior is gradually fed back into the expectations of the players. As the linear
tracing procedure proceeds, both the prior and the best responses will gradually change
until both converge to some Nash equilibrium of the game.
Consider a non-cooperative N -person normal form game   = (
1
; : : : ;
N
; R
1
; : : : ; R
N
):
Each player i = 1; : : : ; N; has M
i
pure strategies. The k-th pure strategy of player i is
denoted by (i; k): The set of pure strategies of player i is denoted by 
i
: The total number
of strategies is given by M =
P
N
i=1
M
i
: The set of all pure strategy combinations is given
by  =
Q
N
i=1

i
: The function R
i
: ! IR denotes the payo function of a player i and it is
extended in the standard way to the set of all mixed strategy combinations S =
Q
N
i=1
S
M
i
:
Here we identify all probability distributions on 
i
with S
M
i
= fs
i
2 IR
M
i
j
P
M
i
j=1
s
ij
= 1g:
Given a mixed strategy combination s 2 S and a mixed strategy s
i
2 S
i
; we denote by
s n s
i
the mixed strategy combination that results from replacing s
i
by s
i
: The set of Nash
equilibria of   is denoted NE( ):
A probability distribution s
0
2 S; called the prior, is given for the remainder of this
paper. The prior describes the initial beliefs of all players about the strategies played by the
other players. The prior is assumed to be the same for all players, and the determination
of the prior is part of the equilibrium selection theory of Harsanyi and Selten (1988). For
every  2 [0; 1]; the linear tracing procedure generates a Nash equilibrium of the game
 

= (
1
; : : : ;
N
; H

1
; : : : ; H

N
); where the payo function H

i
: S ! IR of player i is
dened by
H

i
(s) = R
i
(s) + (1  )R
i
(s
0
n s
i
):
The game  
0
corresponds to a trivial game, where all players believe that all their opponents
play with probability 1 according to the prior beliefs. The game  
1
coincides with the
game  : The linear tracing procedure links a Nash equilibrium of the game  
0
; to a Nash
equilibrium of  
1
: Let L denote the set of all Nash equilibria related to the games  

;
 2 [0; 1]; so
L = f(; s) 2 [0; 1] S j s 2 NE( 

)g:
The linear tracing procedure is said to feasible if there exists a continuous function  :
[0; 1]! L; i.e. a path, such that (0) 2 L\ (f0gS) and (1) 2 L\ (f1gS): The linear
tracing procedure is said to be well-dened if there exists a unique way to connect (0)
to (1) by a continuous function. We consider feasibility as the more important property.
Indeed, it is possible to go from feasibility to well-denedness by invoking certain regularity
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properties of L: These regularity properties follow from the theory of dierential topology,
as L is a set dened by M equations in M + 1 unknowns, leaving one degree of freedom
for a typical game, see Herings and Peeters (1999) for a rigorous proof.
Since L is a set that can be described by a nite number of polynomial inequalities, it
is a semi-algebraic set. All the components of L; that is all maximally connected subsets of
L; are also path-connected. Therefore, any two points in a component of L can be joined
by a path, see for instance Schanuel, Simon, and Zame (1991) for a nice introduction into
the properties of semi-algebraic sets. To show that the linear tracing procedure is feasible,
it is sucient to show that L has a component that intersects both the sets f0g  S and
f1g  S:
The proof of feasibility of the linear tracing procedure presented here is not new. It
coincides with one of the proofs proposed in Herings (1997b). It is repeated here for
illustrational purposes, as the connection between Browder's xed point theorem and the
tracing procedure is the closest of all the adjustment processes that we will consider.
Let the function 
i
: [0; 1] S ! S
M
i
be dened by

i
(; s) = arg max
s
i
2S
M
i
R
i
(s n s
i
) + (1  )R
i
(s
0
n s
i
)  ks
i
  s
i
k
2
2
:
The function 
i
is continuous since the penalty  ks
i
  s
i
k
2
2
is strictly concave in s
i
:
We dene the function f : [0; 1] S ! S by
f(; s) = (
1
(; s); : : : ; 
N
(; s)):
The xed points of f are closely related to the strategies in the set L:
Theorem 3.1: For any non-cooperative N-person game  ; for any prior s
0
; it holds
that (; s) 2 L if and only if there is  2 [0; 1] such that f(; s) = s:
Proof: It is obvious that (; s) 2 L implies f(; s) = s:
Suppose there is (; s) 2 [0; 1]S such that f(; s) = s; but (; s) =2 L: Then, for some
s
i
2 S
M
i
; H

i
(s n s
i
) H

i
(s) = h > 0: Since H

i
(s n s
i
) =
P
(i;k)2
i
s
ik
H

i
(s n (i; k)); it holds
that, for 0 < " < 1; H

i
(sn"s
i
+(1 ")s
i
) H

i
(s) = "h > 0: Now, k("s
i
+(1 ")s
i
) s
i
k
2
=
"
2
ks
i
  s
i
k
2
< "h; for small enough "; contradicting that s
i
is the argument maximizing
the expression in the denition of 
i
(; s): Q.E.D.
The argument given in the proof of Theorem 3.1 is the same as the one used in Geanako-
plos (1996), where Brouwer's xed point theorem, as opposed to Kakutani's xed point
theorem, is used to show the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a nite non-cooperative
N -person game.
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Theorem 3.2: For any non-cooperative N-person game  ; for any prior s
0
; the tracing
procedure is feasible.
Proof: It is immediate that f satises the conditions of Browder's xed point theo-
rem and so there is a component F
c
of F = f(; s) 2 [0; 1]  S j s = f(; s)g such that
(f0gS)\F
c
6= ; and (f1gS)\F
c
6= ;: By Theorem 3.1 it follows that F = L; so F
c
is
a subset of L that connects a best response to the prior s
0
to a Nash equilibrium s

: Q.E.D.
Feasibility of the tracing procedure is a corollary to Browder's xed point theorem.
4 The Quantal Response Equilibria of McKelvey and
Palfrey
Quantal response equilibria as introduced in McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), are statistical
versions of Nash equilibria, where each player's payo is subject to random error. One
possible interpretation is that players make errors according to some random process when
calculating their expected payos. An alternative interpretation is that players calculate
expected payos correctly, but have an additive payo disturbance associated with each
available pure strategy. For a given specication of the error structure, a quantal response
equilibrium is a mixed strategy combination that is consistent with optimizing behavior
subject to the error structure.
Consider a non-cooperative N -person normal form game   = (
1
; : : : ;
N
; R
1
; : : : ; R
N
):
Player i's payo when playing pure strategy (i; k) against a mixed strategy combination s
is subject to error and is given by
b
R
i
(s n (i; k)) = R
i
(s n (i; k)) + "
ik
:
Player i's error vector "
i
= ("
i1
; : : : ; "
iM
i
) is distributed according to a joint distribution
with density function 
i
: Given the vector of payos that player i receives when playing
his pure strategies and when errors are absent, R
i
= (R
i
(s n (i; 1)); : : : ; R
i
(s n (i;M
i
))) for
some s 2 S; the ik-response set E
ik
(R
i
) is dened as the set of error vectors that make
pure strategy (i; k) the best response, so
E
ik
(R
i
) = f"
i
2 IR
M
i
j R
ik
+ "
ik
 R
ij
+ "
ij
; j = 1; : : : ;M
i
g:
The probability of choosing pure strategy (i; k) is then given by

ik
(R
i
) =
Z
"
i
2E
ik
(R
i
)

i
("
i
)d"
i
:
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A quantal response equilibrium is a mixed strategy combination s

2 S that is consistent
with the error structure, thus
s

ik
= 
ik
(R
i
(s

n (i; 1)); : : : ; R
i
(s

n (i;M
i
))); i = 1; : : : ; N; k = 1; : : : ;M
i
:
The following specication of the error structure is quite common in the theory of
individual choice behavior, see Luce (1959), and leads to the logistic quantal response
equilibria. For any parameter   0; the logistic quantal response function is dened by

ik
(R
i
) =
exp(R
ik
)
P
M
i
j=1
exp(R
ij
)
; R
i
2 IR
M
i
;
and is obtained when 
i
corresponds to the extreme value distribution. The parameter 
is inversely related to the error level. When  = 0; the choice of all players is completely
determined by the errors, and corresponds to playing all pure strategies with equal prob-
ability. When  approaches innity, the inuence of the errors disappears. This suggests
a way of selecting Nash equilibria analogously to the tracing procedure. Start from the
quantal response equilibrium at  = 0 and let the inuence of errors go to zero. McKelvey
and Palfrey (1995) show that for generic games, this approach selects a unique Nash equi-
librium. We show that for all games the quantal response equilibrium at  = 0 is connected
by a set of quantal response equilibria to at least one Nash equilibrium.
Given an error level corresponding to ; the set of quantal response equilibria of   is
denoted QRE

( ): Let Q denote the set of all quantal response equilibria for varying values
of  2 IR
+
; so
Q = f(; s) 2 IR
+
 S j s 2 QRE

( )g;
or alternatively
Q = f(; s) 2 IR
+
 S j s
ik
=
exp(R
i
(s n (i; k)))
P
M
i
j=1
exp(R
i
(s n (i; j)))
; i = 1; : : : ; N; k = 1; : : : ;M
i
g:
To investigate whether the quantal response equilibrium at  = 0 is connected to a Nash
equilibrium, it is useful to make the transformation  = =(1  ) and to dene
e
Q = f(; s) 2 [0; 1) S j s
ik
=
exp(

1 
R
i
(s n (i; k)))
P
M
i
j=1
exp(

1 
R
i
(s n (i; j)))
; i = 1; : : : ; N; k = 1; : : : ;M
i
g:
We dene the function f : [0; 1) S ! S by
f
ik
(; s) =
exp(

1 
R
i
(s n (i; k)))
P
M
i
j=1
exp(

1 
R
i
(s n (i; j)))
; i = 1; : : : ; N; k = 1; : : : ;M
i
:
The xed points of f are closely related to the strategies in the set
e
Q:
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Theorem 4.1: For any non-cooperative N-person game  ; it holds that (; s) 2
e
Q if
and only if there is  2 [0; 1) such that f(; s) = s:
Proof: Obvious. Q.E.D.
The following result follows immediately from Browder's xed point theorem, so a proof
is omitted.
Theorem 4.2: For any non-cooperative N-person game  ; for any  2 (0; 1); there is
a component
e
Q
c
of
e
Q such that (f0g  S) \Q
c
6= ; and (fg  S) \Q
c
6= ;:
The theorem makes clear that the unique quantal response equilibrium at  = 0 is
connected by quantal response equilibria to a quantal response equilibrium for an arbitrarily
high value of :
The next step is to extend Theorem 4.2 and to consider what happens in the limit. In
particular, we want to show that the quantal response equilibrium at  = 0 is connected
by quantal response equilibria to a Nash equilibrium. To this end, we dene
Q =
e
Q [ (f1g  NE( ))
and we show the following result.
Theorem 4.3: For any non-cooperative N-person game  ; there is a component Q
c
of
Q such that (f0g  S) \ Q
c
6= ; and (f1g  S) \ Q
c
6= ;:
Proof: For n 2 IN; denote the component
e
Q
c
of
e
Q such that (f0g  S) \Q
c
6= ; and
(f1 
1
n
g  S) \ Q
c
6= ; by
e
Q
n
: Note that, for n 2 IN;
e
Q
n

e
Q
n+1
: By Mas-Colell (1985),
Theorem A.5.1.(ii), page 10, the closed limit of the sequence
e
Q
n
; denoted Q
c
; is connected.
We show that Q
c
 Q:
Let (; s) be an element of Q
c
: Then there exists a sequence of points f(
n
; s
n
)g
n2IN
such that 
n
< 1; f(
n
; s
n
) = s
n
; and (
n
; s
n
)! (; s): If  < 1; then the continuity of f
implies (; s) 2
e
Q  Q: Suppose  = 1; and suppose s is not a Nash equilibrium. Then
there is a player i; a pair of pure strategies (i; k) and (i; l); and " > 0 such that s
ik
> 0;
but R
i
(s n (i; k)) + " < R
i
(s n (i; l)): Since s
n
! s; there is n such that R
i
(s
n
n (i; k)) + " <
R
i
(s
n
n (i; l)) for all n  n: However,
lim
n!1
f
ik
(
n
; s
n
) = lim
n!1
exp(

n
1 
n
R
i
(s
n
n (i; k)))
P
M
i
j=1
exp(

n
1 
n
R
i
(s
n
n (i; j)))
 lim
n!1
exp(

n
1 
n
R
i
(s
n
n (i; k)))
exp(

n
1 
n
R
i
(s
n
n (i; l)))
= 0:
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Therefore,
0 < s
ik
= lim
n!1
s
n
ik
= lim
n!1
f
ik
(
n
; s
n
) = 0;
a contradiction. We have shown that Q
c
 Q:
The property that (f0g  S) \Q
c
6= ; and (f1g  S) \ Q
c
6= ; is immediate. Q.E.D.
As was the case for the tracing procedure, Browder's xed point theorem is the basic
tool needed to show the connectedness of the quantal response equilibrium at  = 0 to a
Nash equilibrium.
5 The Global Newton Method of Smale
The correspondence with Browder's xed point theorem is almost immediate for procedures
to select Nash equilibria in games. For price adjustment processes, the relationship is a
little harder to detect.
There are several versions of Smale's global Newton method. Here we follow the ap-
proach suggested in Smale (1976) on page 117 to apply his method to the function
z(p)  z(p)1 ; p 2 IR
L
+
n f0g;
where z : IR
L
+
nf0g ! IR
L
is an excess demand function of an economy, z(p) =
P
L
l=1
z
l
(p)=L
is the mean excess demand at p; and 1 is a vector of ones of appropriate dimension. The
zero points of z() coincide with the zero points of z()  z()1 : The following assumption
is made throughout this section.
Assumption 1: The function z : IR
L
+
n f0g ! IR
L
satises:
1. Continuity.
2. Homogeneity: for every p 2 IR
L
+
n f0g; for all  > 0; z(p) = z(p):
3. Walras' law: for every p 2 IR
L
+
n f0g; p  z(p) = 0:
4. Boundary behavior: for every p 2 IR
L
+
n (IR
L
++
[ f0g); z(p)   z(p)1 is not radially
outward pointing.
Assumption 1 is weak version of the assumption in Smale (1976), where twice continuous
dierentiability of z is assumed and a rather complicated boundary condition is stated. We
follow here the suggestion of Varian (1977) and weaken the boundary condition of Smale
11
(1976) to the requirement that z(p)  z(p)1 is not radially outward pointing, i.e. there is
no  > 0 such that z(p)  z(p)1 = (p  (1=L)1 ):
The assumed boundary behavior is weaker than the requirement that z
l
(p) > 0 for
some l 2 L for which p
l
= 0; a requirement that is natural for a function dened on
IR
L
+
n f0g: Indeed, if l is such that p
l
= 0 and z
l
(p) > 0; then Walras' law implies that
there is l
0
such that p
l
0
> 0 and z
l
(p) > z
l
0
(p): So, z
l
(p)   z(p) > z
l
0
(p)   z(p); whereas
 1=L = p
l
  1=L < p
l
0
  1=L; which implies that z(p)   z(p) is not radially outward
pointing.
By Walras' law we can normalize prices such as to belong to S
L
: The suggestion of
Varian (1977)
1
is to extend z(p)  z(p)1 as follows to a function
e
z : B
L
\T
L
! IR
L
; where
B
L
=
(
p 2 IR
L





L
X
l=1
(p
l
  1=L)
2
 1
)
;
T
L
=
(
p 2 IR
L





L
X
l=1
p
l
= 1
)
:
The radial projection on S
L
is denoted by
e
; so if p 2 T
L
n S
L
; and l
0
2 argmin
l=1;:::;L
p
l
;
then
e
(p) =
1=L
1=L  p
l
0
p+
 p
l
0
1=L  p
l
0
(1=L)1 :
If p 2 S
L
; then
e
(p) = p:
The function
e
z : B
L
\ T
L
! IR
L
is dened by
e
z(p) =
e
(p)  p+ (1  kp  (1=L)1k
2
) (z(
e
(p))  z(
e
(p))1 ) ; p 2 B
L
\ T
L
:
The function
e
z is a positive multiple of z(p)  z(p)1 on S
L
and is continuous on B
L
\ T
L
:
The contribution of the term z(
e
(p))   z(
e
(p))1 vanishes on the relative boundary of
B
L
\T
L
; where it holds that kp  (1=L)1k
2
= 1: This makes the function
e
z radially inward
pointing on the relative boundary of B
L
\ T
L
: The term
e
(p)  p vanishes for p 2 S
L
:
Replacing z(p)  z(p)1 by
e
z(p) does not eliminate any zero points. It also doesn't add
new zero points. There are no equilibria of
e
z on the relative boundary of B
L
\ T
L
as the
term 1 kp  (1=L)1k
2
vanishes there and the remaining term is
e
(p) p: Consider a point
p not on the relative boundary of B
L
\ T
L
and outside S
L
: Then
e
z(p) = 0 if and only if
e
(p)  p+ (1  kp  (1=L)1k
2
)(z(
e
(p))  z(
e
(p))1 ) = 0:
Then it holds that
z(
e
(p))  z(
e
(p))1 =
1
1  kp  (1=L)1k
2
(p 
e
(p))
=
 Lp
l
0
1  kp  (1=L)1k
2
(
e
(p)  (1=L)1 );
1
The construction of Varian(1977) applies to a more abstract problem on the unit disk, but our variation
of his construction to the set S
L
is rather straightforward.
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where l
0
2 argmin
l=1;:::;L
p
l
: This implies that z is radially outward pointing at
e
(p); a
contradiction to Assumption 1.4.
The dierential equation of Smale's global Newton method is given by
@
b
z(p)
dp
dt
=  (p)
b
z(p);
1
>
dp
dt
= 0;
where  is an arbitrary scalar function of p such that
sign((p)) = sign det@
b
z(p);
and
b
z is the function
e
z with the last component omitted. Since the sum of the components of
e
z(p) equals zero, it holds that 1
>
@
e
z(p) = 0: Then @
b
z(p)
dp
dt
=  (p)
b
z(p) implies @
e
z
L
(p)
dp
dt
=
 (p)
e
z
L
(p); so the adjustment of the price of commodity L is similar to the adjustment
of the prices of other commodities. Since 1
>
dp
dt
= 0; the sum of the prices is kept equal to
one.
We choose the starting price system p
0
in the relative boundary of B
L
\T
L
to guarantee
convergence to a competitive equilibrium price system. In Keenan (1981) it has been shown
that Smale's process may not converge for starting price systems in the relative interior of
B
L
\ T
L
:
As Smale (1976) shows, his process generates price systems in the set
P = fp 2 B
L
\ T
L
j 9  0;
e
z(p) = 
e
z(p
0
)g:
It is easily veried, by taking  = 1; that p
0
2 P; and, by taking  = 0; that p

2 P
if p

2 S
L
is an equilibrium price system. By the arguments given before there are no
solutions for  = 0 with p

2 (B
L
\ T
L
) n S
L
: From the denition of the set P it follows
that the dierential equation adjusts prices in such a way that the excess demand remains
proportional to the excess demand at the starting price system.
Under suitable dierentiability assumptions, for a generic economy, Smale (1976) shows
that the component of P containing p
0
is a path that connects p
0
to a Walrasian equilibrium
price system. We show that even without such dierentiability assumptions, and without
restricting attention to generic economies, the component of P containing p
0
connects p
0
to a Walrasian equilibrium price system. Smale's global Newton method is said to be
convergent if this latter property holds.
For   0; we dene the set
T
L
() =
n
p 2 B
L
\ T
L
j p 
e
z(p
0
)  (1  2)p
0

e
z(p
0
)
o
:
In Figure 1 the set T
L
() is shown for various values of : The set T
L
(0) contains only
the point p
0
: The set T
L
() expands when  increases. The set T
L
(1) equals B
L
\ T
L
: For
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Figure 1. The sets S
L
; T
L
(0); T
L
(1=3); T
L
(2=3) and T
L
(1); for p
0
= (0:545; 0:455; 0:91)
>
:
p 2 B
L
\ T
L
; we dene (p) = (p  p
0
) 
e
z(p
0
)=  2p
0

e
z(p
0
): It holds that p 2 T
L
() if and
only if   (p):
For any non-empty, closed, convex subset X of IR
m
; the continuous function 
X
: IR
m
!
X is the orthogonal projection on X; so 
X
(y) = x if x 2 X and ky   xk
2
 ky   xk
2
; for
all x 2 X: We dene the function f : [0; 1] T
L
(1)! T
L
(1) by
f(; p) = 
T
L
()
(p+
e
z(p)):
The xed points of f coincide with the prices in the set P:
Theorem 5.1: For any excess demand function z satisfying Assumption 1, for any p
0
in
the relative boundary of B
L
\ T
L
; it holds that p 2 P if and only if there is  2 [0; 1] such
that f(; p) = p: Moreover, either
e
z(p) 6= 0 and  = (p) or
e
z(p) = 0 and f(; p) = p for
all   (p):
Proof: Consider a xed point p of f(; ); so p = f(; p) = 
T
L
()
(p+
e
z(p)): We show
that p 2 P:
Since f(0; p) = p
0
; it is obvious that f(0; p) = p implies p = p
0
; so p 2 P: Next consider
the case  > 0: For p in the relative boundary of B
L
\T
L
;
e
z(p) is radially inward pointing,
so obviously 
T
L
()
(p +
e
z(p)) 6= p: Consider p in the relative interior of B
L
\ T
L
: Then
p = 
T
L
()
(p +
e
z(p)) if and only if the projection of p +
e
z(p) on
e
T
L
() = fp 2 T
L
j
p 
e
z(p
0
)  (1  2)p
0

e
z(p
0
)g equals p:
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The projection of an arbitrary vector x on the set
e
T
L
() is determined by the following
optimization problem.
min
y2IR
L
L
X
l=1
1=2(y
l
  x
l
)
2
s.t. (1  2)p
0

e
z(p
0
)  y 
e
z(p
0
)  0:
The necessary and sucient Kuhn-Tucker conditions for an optimum are given by
y   x + 
e
z(p
0
) = 0;
((1  2)p
0

e
z(p
0
)  y 
e
z(p
0
)) = 0;
(1  2)p
0

e
z(p
0
)  y 
e
z(p
0
)  0;
  0;
where y equals the projection 
e
T
L
()
(x) and  denotes the shadow price of the constraint
(1  2)p
0

e
z(p
0
)  y 
e
z(p
0
)  0:
Since p = 
T
L
()
(p+
e
z(p)); it follows that there exists   0 such that
p  p 
e
z(p) + 
e
z(p
0
) = 0;
so
e
z(p) = 
e
z(p
0
); and p 2 P: This completes the rst part of the proof.
Consider some p 2 P: If
e
z(p) = 0; then it is trivially the case that f(; p) = p when-
ever p 2 T
L
(); i.e. when   (p): Suppose
e
z(p) 6= 0: It is obvious that f(; p) 6= p
when  6= (p): It remains to be shown that f((p); p) = p: If (p) = 0; then p = p
0
and trivially f(0; p
0
) = p
0
: Suppose
e
z(p) 6= 0 and (p) > 0: There exists  > 0 such
that
e
z(p) = 
e
z(p
0
): From the necessary and sucient Kuhn-Tucker conditions it fol-
lows that 
e
T
L
((p))
(p +
e
z(p)) = p: Since p 2 T
L
((p)) 
e
T
L
((p)); it holds as well that

T
L
((p))
(p+
e
z(p)) = p: Q.E.D.
When p

is a competitive equilibrium price system, then p

is a xed point of f for any
value of  exceeding (p

): When p is a price system generated by the adjustment process,
but does not correspond to a competitive equilibrium, then p is a xed point of f((p); );
where (p) < 1:
At p
0
the value of () is zero. Along the path of the adjustment process, the value
of () increases initially, but it may decrease later on. Eventually, it will increase until it
reaches the value 1; and a competitive equilibrium has been found.
Theorem 5.2: The price adjustment process converges for any excess demand function
satisfying Assumption 1, for any p
0
in the relative boundary of B
L
\ T
L
:
Proof: It is immediate that f satises the conditions of Browder's xed point theorem
and so there is a component F
c
of F = f(; p) 2 [0; 1]  T
L
(1) j p = f(; p)g such that
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(f0gT
L
(1))\F
c
6= ; and (f1gT
L
(1))\F
c
6= ;: By Theorem 5.1 it follows that F = P;
so F
c
is a subset of P that connects the starting price system p
0
to some competitive
equilibrium price system p

: Q.E.D.
The proof of Theorem 5.2 show that convergence of the price adjustment process is a
corollary to Browder's xed point theorem.
6 The Price Adjustment Process of Kamiya
In Kamiya (1990) the prices of commodities are normalized by assuming that
P
L
l=1
(p
l
)
2
= 1:
An adjustment process is dened for a total excess demand function z : IR
L
+
n f0g ! IR
L
and a starting price system p
0
2 IR
L
++
with
P
L
l=1
(p
0
l
)
2
= 1: The following assumption is
made throughout this section.
Assumption 2: The function z : IR
L
+
n f0g ! IR
L
satises:
1. Continuity.
2. Homogeneity: for every p 2 IR
L
+
n f0g; for all  > 0; z(p) = z(p):
3. Walras' law: for every p 2 IR
L
+
n f0g; p  z(p) = 0:
4. Boundary behavior: for p 2 IR
L
+
n f0g; for l = 1; : : : ; L; p
l
= 0 implies z
l
(p) > 0:
Assumption 2 is a weak version of the assumptions in Kamiya (1990), where also twice
continuous dierentiability of z on IR
L
++
is assumed. Using the normalization discussed
above and Walras' law, we can replace the excess demand function z by the excess demand
function
b
z :
_
B
L 1
+
! IR
L 1
; where
_
B
L 1
+
=
(
b
p 2 IR
L 1
+





L 1
X
l=1
(
b
p
l
)
2
< 1
)
and
b
z
l
(
b
p) = z
l
(
b
p
1
; : : : ;
b
p
L 1
;
q
1 
P
L 1
l=1
(
b
p
l
)
2
); l = 1; : : : ; L  1: The function
b
z is obtained
from omitting the last component of z and making use of the price normalization.
Kamiya's process is a weighted average of Smale's global Newton method, @
b
z(
b
p)
dbp
dt
=
 (
b
p)
b
z(
b
p); and Walrasian tatonnement,
dbp
dt
=
b
z(
b
p): The weights depend on the norm of
the excess demand and the distance between
b
p and the initial price system
b
p
0
; where
b
p
0
denotes the initial price system with component L left out. When formulated as a
dierential equation, Kamiya's process is given by
 
@
b
z(
b
p)
k
b
z(
b
p)k
2
 
I
k
b
p 
b
p
0
k
2
!
d
b
p
dt
=  (
b
p)
b
z(
b
p);
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where I is the (L  1) (L  1) identity matrix and  is an arbitrary scalar function of
b
p
such that
sign((
b
p)) = sign det
 
I
k
b
p 
b
p
0
k
2
 
@
b
z(
b
p)
k
b
z(
b
p)k
2
!
:
Although d
b
p=dt is not directly dened at
b
p =
b
p
0
or for a competitive equilibrium price
system
b
p; it can be appropriately dened by taking a limit. The process corresponds
to Walrasian tatonnement at
b
p
0
; and it becomes Smale's global Newton method as it
approaches an equilibrium.
As Kamiya (1990) shows, prices generated by the dierential equation belong to the
set
P = f
b
p 2 IR
L 1
+
j
P
L 1
l=1
(
b
p
l
)
2
< 1
9 2 [0; 1]; for l = 1; : : : ; L  1; 
b
z
l
(
b
p) = (1  )(
b
p
l
  p
0
l
)g:
It is easily veried that  = 0 yields p = p
0
as the unique solution, so p
0
2 P: By considering
 = 1 it follows that if p

is a Walrasian equilibrium price system with
P
L
l=1
(p

l
)
2
= 1; then
(p

1
; : : : ; p

L 1
) 2 P: From the denition of the set P it follows that the dierential equation
adjusts prices in such a way that the excess demand at a price system is proportional to
the dierence between this price system and the initial price system.
Kamiya (1990) shows that under suitable dierentiability assumptions, for a generic
economy, the component of P containing p
0
is a path that connects p
0
to a Walrasian
equilibrium price system. We show that even without dierentiability assumptions, and
without restricting attention to generic economies, the component of P containing p
0
con-
nects p
0
to a Walrasian equilibrium price system. Kamiya's adjustment process is said to
be convergent if this latter property holds.
It follows from the boundary behavior and the continuity of z that there exists " > 0;
"  p
0
L
; such that z
L
(p) > 0 whenever p
L
 " and
P
L
l=1
(p
l
)
2
= 1: We introduce the set
B
L 1
+
(") = f
b
p 2 IR
L 1
+
j
P
L 1
l=1
(
b
p
l
)
2
 1  "g
and extend the excess demand function
b
z to a function
e
z dened on IR
L 1
by setting
e
z(
b
p) =
b
z(
B
L 1
+
(")
(
b
p));
b
p 2 IR
L 1
:
We dene the set
e
P by omitting the non-negativity constraints on prices in P and
replacing
b
z(
b
p) by
e
z(
b
p); so
e
P = f
b
p 2 IR
L 1
j 9 2 [0; 1], for l = 1; : : : ; L  1; 
e
z
l
(
b
p) = (1  )(
b
p
l
  p
0
l
)g:
Lemma 6.1: For any excess demand function z satisfying Assumption 2, for any
p
0
2 IR
L
++
with
P
L
l=1
(p
0
l
)
2
= 1; it holds that P =
e
P :
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Proof: Consider some
b
p 2 P: First, it is shown that
b
p 2 B
L 1
+
("): Suppose not, then
0 <
q
1 
P
L 1
l=1
(
b
p
l
)
2
< "; so z
L
(
b
p
1
; : : : ;
b
p
L 1
;
q
1 
P
L 1
l=1
(
b
p
l
)
2
) > 0: By Walras's law it
follows that
0 >
L 1
X
l=1
b
p
l
b
z
l
(
b
p):
Since
b
p 2 P there is  2 [0; 1] such that 
b
z
l
(
b
p) = (1  )(
b
p
l
  p
0
l
); l = 1; : : : ; L  1: If  = 0;
then
b
p =
b
p
0
; which implies
q
1 
P
L 1
l=1
(
b
p
l
)
2
= p
0
L
 "; contradicting our supposition. If
 = 1; then
b
z(
b
p) = 0; which contradicts 0 >
P
L 1
l=1
b
p
l
b
z
l
(
b
p): It follows that  2 (0; 1): But
then
L 1
X
l=1
b
p
l
b
z
l
(
b
p) =
1  

L 1
X
l=1
b
p
l
(
b
p
l
  p
0
l
) > 0;
where the inequality comes from
b
p
0
6=
b
p;
P
L 1
l=1
p
0
l

P
L 1
l=1
b
p
l
; and  < 1: This contradicts
0 >
P
L 1
l=1
b
p
l
b
z
l
(
b
p): Consequently,
b
p 2 B
L 1
+
("); from which it is obtained that
e
z(
b
p) =
b
z(
b
p)
and
b
p 2
e
P :
Now consider some
b
p 2
e
P: Suppose
b
p =2 B
L 1
+
("): Denote the projection 
B
L 1
+
(")
(
b
p) by
b
: Then there is l
0
such that
b

l
0
= 0 or
P
L 1
l=1
b

l
= 1   ": In the rst case it holds that
b
p
l
0
 0 and
e
z
l
0
(
b
p) > 0 and, for some  2 (0; 1);
2
0 < 
e
z
l
0
(
b
p) = (1  )(
b
p
l
0
  p
0
l
0
) < 0;
a contradiction. In the latter case it holds that 0 >
P
L 1
l=1
b

l
e
z
l
(
b
p) and, for some  2 (0; 1);

e
z
l
(
b
p) = (1 )(
b
p
l
 p
0
l
); l = 1; : : : ; L 1: Because of the rst case, we may assume without
loss of generality that
b
  0: Then it follows from the properties of the projection that
b
p = 
b
 for some  > 1: Therefore,
0 >
L 1
X
l=1
b

l
e
z
l
(
b
p) = 
L 1
X
l=1
b
p
l
e
z
l
(
b
p) = 
1  

L 1
X
l=1
b
p
l
(
b
p
l
  p
0
l
) > 0;
a contradiction. Consequently,
b
p 2 B
L 1
+
("); from which it is obtained that
e
z(
b
p) =
b
z(
b
p)
and
b
p 2 P: Q.E.D.
The theorem makes clear that we may either study the set P or the set
e
P in order to
study the adjustment process.
For   0; we dene the set
T
L 1
() =
n
b
p 2 IR
L 1


k
b
p 
b
p
0
k
2
 
o
:
In Figure 2 the set T
L 1
() is shown for various values of : The set T
L 1
(0) contains only
the point p
0
: The set T
L 1
() expands when  increases, and T
L 1
(1) contains the set
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Figure 2. The sets
_
B
L 1
+
; T
L 1
(0); T
L 1
(1=3); T
L 1
(2=3) and T
L 1
(1); for p
0
= (1=3; 1=3; 1=3)
>
:
_
B
L 1
+
: For
b
p 2 IR
L 1
; we dene (
b
p) as the distance to
b
p
0
; (
b
p) = k
b
p 
b
p
0
k
2
: It is immediate
that
b
p 2 T
L 1
() for all   (
b
p):
We dene the function f : [0; 1] T
L 1
(1)! T
L 1
(1) by
f(; p) = 
T
L 1
()
(p+
e
z(p)):
The xed points of f coincide with the prices in the set P:
Theorem 6.2: For any excess demand function z satisfying Assumption 2, for any
p
0
with
P
L
l=1
(p
0
l
)
2
= 1; it holds that
b
p 2 P if and only if there is  2 [0; 1] such that
f(;
b
p) =
b
p: Moreover, either
b
z(
b
p) 6= 0 and  = (
b
p) or z(
b
p) = 0 and f(;
b
p) =
b
p for all
  (
b
p):
Proof: Consider a xed point
b
p of f(; ); so
b
p = f(;
b
p) = 
T
L 1
()
(
b
p +
e
z(
b
p)): We
show that
b
p 2
e
P; from which it follows that
b
p 2 P by Lemma 6.1.
Since f(0;
b
p) =
b
p
0
; it is obvious that f(0;
b
p) =
b
p implies
b
p =
b
p
0
; so
b
p 2 P:
Consider the case  > 0: The projection of an arbitrary vector x on the set T
L 1
() is
2
The argument that  2 (0; 1) is similar to the one in the rst part of this proof.
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determined by the following optimization problem.
min
y2IR
L 1
L 1
X
l=1
1=2(y
l
  x
l
)
2
s.t. 
2
 
L 1
X
l=1
(y
l
  p
0
l
)
2
 0:
The necessary and sucient Kuhn-Tucker conditions for an optimum are given by
y
l
  x
l
+ 2(y
l
  p
0
l
) = 0; l = 1; : : : ; L  1;
(
2
 
L 1
X
l=1
(y
l
  p
0
l
)
2
) = 0;

2
 
L 1
X
l=1
(y
l
  p
0
l
)
2
 0;
  0;
where y equals the projection 
T
L 1
()
(x) and  denotes the shadow price of the constraint

2
 
P
L 1
l=1
(y
l
  p
0
l
)
2
 0:
It follows that there exists   0 such that
e
z
l
(
b
p) = 2(
b
p
l
  p
0
l
); l = 1; : : : ; L  1:
Since   0; it follows that
b
p 2 P:
Consider some
b
p 2 P; so
b
p 2
e
P by Lemma 6.1. If
b
z(
b
p) = 0; then it is trivially the case
that f(;
b
p) =
b
p for all   (
b
p): Suppose
b
z(
b
p) 6= 0: If (
b
p) = 0; then
b
p =
b
p
0
and trivially
f(0;
b
p
0
) =
b
p
0
: Suppose
b
z(
b
p) 6= 0 and (
b
p) > 0: We need to show that f((
b
p);
b
p) =
b
p; which
is equivalent to the statement that the projection of
b
p+
e
z(
b
p) on T
L 1
((
b
p)) equals
b
p:
Since (
b
p) > 0 there exists  2 (0; 1) such that 
e
z
l
(p) = (1 )(p
l
 p
0
l
); l = 1; : : : ; L 1:
Substitute in the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, y
l
=
b
p
l
; x
l
=
b
p
l
+
e
z
l
(
b
p);  =

2(1 )
and observe
that all equalities and inequalities in the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are satised. Q.E.D.
When p

is a competitive equilibrium, then (p

1
; : : : ; p

L 1
) is a xed point of f for any
value of  exceeding (p

1
; : : : ; p

L 1
):When
b
p is a price system generated by the adjustment
process, but does not correspond to a competitive equilibrium, then
b
p is a xed point of
f((
b
p); ):
At
b
p
0
the value of () is zero. Along the path of the adjustment process, the value
of () increases initially, but it may decrease later on. Eventually, it will increase until it
reaches the value 1, and a competitive equilibrium has been found.
Theorem 6.3: The price adjustment process converges for any excess demand function
satisfying Assumption 2, for any p
0
2 IR
L
++
with
P
L
l=1
(p
0
l
)
2
= 1:
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Proof: It is immediate that f satises the conditions of Browder's xed point theo-
rem and so there is a component F
c
of F = f(;
b
p) 2 [0; 1] T
L 1
(1) j
b
p = f(;
b
p)g such
that (f0g  T
L 1
(1)) \ F
c
6= ; and (f1g  T
L 1
(1)) \ F
c
6= ;: By Theorem 6.2 it follows
that F = P; so F
c
is a subset of P that connects the starting price system
b
p
0
to some
competitive equilibrium price system
b
p

: Q.E.D.
Convergence of the price adjustment process is a corollary to Browder's xed point
theorem.
7 The Price Adjustment Process of van der Laan and
Talman
Van der Laan and Talman (1987) introduce a price adjustment process for an exchange
economy. The prices of the commodities are normalized by
P
L
l=1
p
l
= 1:Given a total excess
demand function z : IR
L
++
! IR
L
and a starting price system p
0
2 IR
L
++
with
P
L
l=1
p
0
l
= 1;
the adjustment process generates price systems in the set
P = fp 2 IR
L
++
j
P
L
l=1
p
l
= 1;
for l
0
= 1; : : : ; L; z
l
0
(p) < 0)
p
l
0
p
0
l
0
= min
l=1;:::;L
p
l
p
0
l
;
for l
0
= 1; : : : ; L; z
l
0
(p) > 0)
p
l
0
p
0
l
0
= max
l=1;:::;L
p
l
p
0
l
g:
Two types of restrictions are made on prices in the set P: The rst is an innocuous price
normalization,
P
L
l=1
p
l
= 1: The second concerns the requirement that the relative price of a
commodity, i.e. the ratio of the price of a commodity and its initial price, be minimal when
the commodity is in positive excess supply, and maximal when the commodity is in positive
excess demand. This is closely related to the ideas behind Walrasian tatonnement, where
prices of commodities in positive excess supply are decreased and those of commodities
in positive excess demand are increased. It is obvious that the starting price system p
0
belongs to P: It can also be veried that whenever p

is a Walrasian equilibrium price
system with
P
L
l=1
p

l
= 1; then p

2 P:
In Herings (1997) it is shown that, under suitable dierentiability assumptions, for a
generic economy, the component of P containing p
0
is a path that connects p
0
to a Walrasian
equilibrium price system. We show that even without such dierentiability assumptions,
and without restricting attention to generic economies, the component of P containing p
0
connects p
0
to a Walrasian equilibrium price system. The adjustment process is said to be
convergent if this latter property holds.
To simplify the exposition, we renormalize the units of measurement of quantities of
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commodities to make sure that p
0
= (1=3; 1=3; 1=3): It follows that the set P is given by
P = fp 2 IR
L
++
j
P
L
l=1
p
l
= 1;
for l
0
= 1; : : : ; L; z
l
0
(p) < 0) p
l
0
= min
l=1;:::;L
p
l
;
for l
0
= 1; : : : ; L; z
l
0
(p) > 0) p
l
0
= max
l=1;:::;L
p
l
g:
We may also take the value of excess demand v(p); dened by a function v : IR
L
++
! IR
L
;
where
v
l
(p) = p
l
z
l
(p); l = 1; : : : ; L;
instead of the excess demand z(p); to dene the set P: Since v(p) is positive (negative) if
and only if z(p) is positive (negative), it follows that replacing z(p) by v(p) leaves the set
P unchanged.
We assume that z : IR
L
++
! IR
L
is an excess demand function, so it satises Assump-
tion 3.
Assumption 3: The function z : IR
L
++
! IR
L
satises:
1. Continuity.
2. Homogeneity: for every p 2 IR
L
++
; for all  > 0; z(p) = z(p):
3. Walras' law: for every p 2 IR
L
++
; p  z(p) = 0:
4. Boundary behavior: when (p
n
)
n2IN
is a sequence converging to p 2 IR
L
+
n f0g; then
lim
n!1
kz(p
n
)k
1
= +1:
Contrary to Assumptions 1 and 2, Assumption 3 follows from standard assumptions on
primitives, that is from standard assumptions on consumption sets, utility functions, and
initial endowments.
The continuity and the boundary behavior of z imply that we can choose " > 0 such
that for any p 2 S
L
(") = fp 2 S
L
j p
l
 "; l = 1; : : : ; Lg; it holds that z
l
(p) > 0 for some
l with 0 < p
l
 ":
We modify the value function v near the boundary of S
L
and extend it to a function
e
v
dened on T
L
= fp 2 IR
L
j
P
L
l=1
p
l
= 1g by setting
e
v(p) = v(
S
L
(")
(p)); p 2 T
L
:
We dene the set
e
P by omitting non-negativity constraints and replacing z(p) by
e
v(p); so
e
P = fp 2 T
L
j for l
0
= 1; : : : ; L;
e
v
l
0
(p) < 0) p
l
0
= min
l=1;:::;L
p
l
;
for l
0
= 1; : : : ; L;
e
v
l
0
(p) > 0) p
l
0
= max
l=1;:::;L
p
l
g:
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Lemma 7.1: For any excess demand function z satisfying Assumption 3, it holds that
P =
e
P:
Proof: Consider some p 2 P: It is immediate that p 2 S
L
(") and
e
v(p) = v(p):
Therefore,
e
v
l
(p) > 0 if and only if z
l
(p) > 0 and
e
v
l
(p) < 0 if and only if z
l
(p) < 0: So,
p 2
e
P:
Consider some p 2
e
P: Suppose p =2 S
L
("): There is l
0
such that 
S
L
(")
l
0
(p) = " and
z
l
0
(
S
L
(")
(p)) > 0: But then
e
v
l
0
(p) > 0 and p
l
0
< max
l=1;:::;L
p
l
; a contradiction to p 2
e
P :
Consequently, p 2 S
L
("): Therefore,
e
v
l
(p) > 0 if and only if z
l
(p) > 0 and
e
v
l
(p) < 0 if and
only if z
l
(p) < 0: So, p 2 P: Q.E.D.
For   0; we dene the set
T
L
() =
n
p 2 T
L
j p
k
  p
l
 ; k; l = 1; : : : ; L; k 6= l
o
:
In Figure 3 the set T
L
() is shown for various values of : The set T
L
(0) contains only the
point (1=3; 1=3; 1=3): The set T
L
() expands when  increases. The set T
L
(1) contains the
set S
L
:
0
B
@
1
0
0
1
C
A
0
B
@
0
1
0
1
C
A
0
B
@
0
0
1
1
C
A
Figure 3. The sets S
L
; T
L
(0); T
L
(1=3); T
L
(2=3) and T
L
(1):
For p 2 IR
L
; we dene (p) = max
k 6=l
p
k
  p
l
: It is immediate that p 2 T
L
() for all
  (p): We dene the function f : [0; 1] T
L
(1)! T
L
(1) by
f(; p) = 
T
L
()
(p+
e
v(p)):
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The xed points of f coincide with the prices in the set P:
Theorem 7.2: For any excess demand function z satisfying Assumption 3, it holds
that p 2 P if and only if there is  2 [0; 1] such that f(; p) = p: Moreover, either z(p) 6= 0
and  = (p); or z(p) = 0 and f(; p) = p for all   (p):
Proof: Consider a xed point p of f(; ); so p = f(; p) = 
T
L
()
(p+
e
v(p)): We show
that p 2
e
P ; from which it follows that p 2 P by Lemma 7.1.
The projection of an arbitrary vector x on the set T
L
() is determined by the following
optimization problem.
min
y2IR
L
L
X
l=1
1=2(y
l
  x
l
)
2
s.t.
L
X
l=1
y
l
  1 = 0;
y
k
  y
l
    0; k 6= l:
The necessary and sucient Kuhn-Tucker conditions for an optimum are given by
y
l
= x
l
+  
X
k 6=l

l;k
+
X
k 6=l

k;l
; l = 1; : : : ; L;
L
X
l=1
y
l
  1 = 0;

k;l
(y
k
  y
l
  ) = 0; k 6= l;
y
k
  y
l
    0; k 6= l;

k;l
 0; k 6= l;
where y equals the projection 
T
L
()
(x);  denotes the shadow price of the constraint
P
L
l=1
y
l
  1 = 0; and 
k;l
; k 6= l; denotes the shadow price of the constraint y
k
  y
l
   0:
Since p = 
T
L
()
(p +
e
v(p)); it follows that there exists  2 IR and 
k;l
 0; k 6= l; such
that
e
v
l
(p) =  +
X
k 6=l

l;k
 
X
k 6=l

k;l
; l = 1; : : : ; L:
Moreover,
1 =
L
X
l=1
p
l
=
L
X
l=1
0
@
p
l
+
e
v
l
(p) +  
X
k 6=l

l;k
+
X
k 6=l

k;l
1
A
= 1 +
L
X
l=1
e
v
l
(p) + L+
L
X
l=1
0
@
 
X
k 6=l

l;k
+
X
k 6=l

k;l
1
A
= 1 + L;
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so  = 0 and
e
v
l
(p) =
X
k 6=l

l;k
 
X
k 6=l

k;l
; l = 1; : : : ; L:
It also holds that

k;l
(p
k
  p
l
  ) = 0; k 6= l:
Suppose
e
v
l
0
(p) < 0 for some l
0
: Then 
k;l
0
> 0 for some k; so p
l
0
= p
k
  : Since for all
l; p
l
 p
k
  ; it holds that p
l
0
= min
l=1;:::;L
p
l
: Similarly it can be shown that
e
v
l
0
(p) > 0
implies p
l
0
= max
l=1;:::;L
p
l
: Consequently, it holds that p 2
e
P :
Consider some p 2 P; so p 2
e
P by Lemma 7.1. If z(p) = 0; then it is trivially
the case that f(; p) = p for all   (p): Suppose z(p) 6= 0: We need to show that
f((p); p) = p; which implies that the projection of p +
e
v(p) on T
L
() equals p: This is
achieved by substituting in the Kuhn-Tucker conditions y
l
= p
l
; x
l
= p
l
+
e
v
l
(p);  = 0;
 = (p); 
k;l
=
e
v
k
(p)
e
v
l
(p)=v if
e
v
k
(p) > 0 and
e
v
l
(p) < 0; and 
k;l
= 0; otherwise, where
v =
P
fljev
l
(p)<0g
e
v
l
(p): Observe that all equalities and inequalities in the Kuhn-Tucker con-
ditions are satised. Q.E.D.
When p

is a competitive equilibrium, then p

is a xed point of f for any value of 
exceeding (p

): When p is a price system generated by the adjustment process, but not a
competitive equilibrium, then p is a xed point of f((p); ):
At p
0
the value of () is zero. Along the path of the adjustment process, the value
of () increases initially, but it may decrease later on. Eventually, it will increase until it
reaches the value 1; and a competitive equilibrium has been found.
Theorem 7.3: The price adjustment process converges for any excess demand function
satisfying Assumption 3.
Proof: It is immediate that f satises the conditions of Browder's xed point theorem
and so there is a component F
c
of F = f(; p) 2 [0; 1]  T
L
(1) j p = f(; p)g such that
(f0gT
L
(1))\F
c
6= ; and (f1gT
L
(1))\F
c
6= ;: By Theorem 7.2 it follows that F = P;
so F
c
is a subset of P that connects the starting price system p
0
to some competitive
equilibrium price system p

: Q.E.D.
Once again, the convergence of a price adjustment process is intimately connected to
Browder's xed point theorem.
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8 Conclusion
We have studied the convergence of a number of distinct adjustment processes in game
theory and in general equilibrium theory. Convergence of the processes has been shown
before in the literature by rather ad hoc arguments, and only for generic games and generic
economies, under suitable dierentiability assumptions. We have argued that the driving
force behind convergence is to be found in Browder's xed point theorem, which applies
under very general conditions and does not involve any assumptions on dierentiability.
It is remarkable that not only existence of equilibrium, but also universal stability, is
fundamentally based on xed point theory. The use of Browder's result provides a uniform
and simple way to show convergence of all the adjustment processes considered. It also
enables us to design a sheer unlimited number of new adjustment processes, that are
universally convergent.
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